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The American Bar Association's(ABA's) call for a moratorium onexecutions demonstrates the rec-
ognition by the ABA that fairness has
been sacrificed for results in the courts
of the United States. The ABA's call for a
moratorium should be the basis for a
widespread reexamination by the bar,
the judiciary, legislators, and citizens of
the enormous price of compromising
the integrity of the legal system that is
being paid to carry out executions.
The question remains whetherjurisdic-
tions that want to carry out executions
will pay a relatively modest price for
competent representation of those fac-
ing the executioner and for procedures
to guard against racial bias entering the
capital sentencing process, and whether
the Congress and the President will re-
store full review of capital cases by inde-
pendent federal courts. The prospects
do not look encouraging. The lack of
commitment to fairness should be im-
mensely disturbing to anyone who cares
aboutjustice, regardless of one's view on
capital punishment.
The report regarding implementation
of the ABA's call for a moratorium dem-
onstrates that whether someone is sen-
tenced to death is influenced by poverty
and race; that the mentally ill, the men-
tally retarded, and children are not pro-
tected from the executioner; and that
the role of the federal courts in prevent-
ing unconstitutional executions has been
severely curtailed by the courts and the
Congress.
The ABA's report is not the first indica-
tion thatjustice is not being achieved in
the process by which human beings are
selected to die in the United States. But
previous warnings largely have been ig-
nored in public discussion of crime is-
sues as politicians compete to prove who
is the "toughest on crime" by promising
more death sentences, less due process,
and swifter executions.
Three U.S. Supreme Court justices-
all of whom were appointed by Republi-
can presidents and all of whom voted to
uphold death penalty statutes in 1976
and in the following years-have ex-
pressed broad concerns that the prom-
ise of fair and consistent application of
the death penalty, supposedly guaran-
teed by the statutes upheld in 1976, has
not been realized.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun concluded
before his retirement from the U.S.
Supreme Court that "the death penalty
experiment has failed" because "no com-
bination of procedural rules or substan-
tive regulations ever can save the death
penalty from its inherent constitutional
deficiencies."1
Justice Lewis Powell, who wrote the
Supreme Court's opinion in McCleskey v.
Kemp,2 which, by a five-to-four vote, al-
lowed Georgia to carry out its death
penalty law despite significant racial dis-
parities in its infliction, told his biogra-
pher that he later regretted his vote in
McCleskey more than any other during
his tenure on the Court.3
Justice John Paul Stevens questioned
the continued use of the death penalty
in a speech to the ABA in August 1996,
observing that the "recent development
of reliable scientific evidentiary methods
has made it possible to establish conclu-
sively that a disturbing number of per-
sons who ha[ve] been sentenced to death
were actually innocent."4 This, Justice
Stevens continued, "most dramatically
illustrates" the consequences of the fail-
ure to provide competent legal counsel
to the poor.5
A total of fifty-nine people sentenced
to death in the United States since 1973
have been found innocent and released
from prison. 6 Others' death sentences
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about their guilt. Still others have been
executed despite questions of inno-
cence. These cases of innocence are
troubling not only because there have
been so many of them, but because in
many of them innocence was established
not by the legal process but by those
outside the legal system.
For example, three men, including
one sentenced to death, were released
by the State of Illinois after their inno-
cence was demonstrated by ajournalism
professor and his class at Northwestern
University.7 Alabama courts ordered the
release of Walter McMillian, who spent
six years on Alabama's death row for a
crime he did not commit, only after the
CBS News program 60 Minutes reported
on his innocence.' Similarly, it was only
after 60 Minutes publicized the inno-
cence of Clarence Lee Brandley that the
Texas courts, which had twice previously
denied relief, ordered a hearing that
eventually led to his release.9 Randall
Dale Adams, whose story was told in the
motion picture The Thin Blue Line, was
released from death row only because
filmmakers demonstrated his inno-
cence.10 One cannot help but wonder
how many other cases involving issues of
innocence do not come to the attention
ofjournalists or filmmakers.
The role of race in the infliction of the
death penalty and the lack of indepen-
dence of elected state court judges to
protect constitutional rights in capital
cases were identified by the Interna-
tional Commission ofJurists, in a report
issued inJuly 1996, as serious flaws in the
process of imposing death in the United
States.'1 The Commission's concerns
about the lack of an independent judi-
ciary were confirmed the following Au-
gust whenJustice Penny White was voted
off the Tennessee Supreme Court in a
retention election that became a referen-
dum on the death penalty. White had
participated in only one capital case in
nineteen months on the court. She con-
curred in an opinion that upheld the
conviction but remanded the case for a
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new sentencing hearing due to constitu-
tional error.12 Immediately after the re-
tention election, the Governor of Tennes-
see, Don Sundquist, said: "Should a
judge look over his shoulder [in making
decisions] about whether they're going
to be thrown out of office? I hope so." 13
A number of other judges and justices
have been removed from office based on
unpopular-but constitutionally re-
quired-votes to set aside death sen-
tences.
14
But the most disturbing evidence that
fairness is being sacrificed in the pursuit
of executions comes not from the reflec-
tions of U.S. Supreme Court justices,
reports of distinguished organizations,
or court opinions, but from the pages of
the Houston Chronicle. Since the reinstate-
ment of capital punishment in 1976,
more people sentenced to death in Har-
ris County, which includes Houston, have
been executed than from any state other
than Texas. 15 The Chronicle described as
follows the process by which one man
was condemned to die in Houston:
Seated beside his client-a convicted
capital murderer-defense attorney
John Benn spent much of Thursday
afternoon's trial in apparent deep sleep.
His mouth kept falling open and his
head lolled back on his shoulders, and
then he awakened just long enough to
catch himself and sit upright. Then it
happened again. And again. And again.
Every time he opened his eyes, a
different prosecution witness was on
the stand describing another aspect of
the November 19, 1991, arrest of
George McFarland in the robbery-
killing of grocer Kenneth Kwan.
When state District Judge Doug
Shaver finally called a recess, Benn was
asked if he truly had fallen asleep dur-
ing a capital murder trial.
"It's boring," the 72-year-old long-
time Houston lawyer explained. 16
This kind of representation does not
offend the Sixth Amendment, the trial
judge explained, because, "[t] he Consti-
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tution doesn't say the lawyer has to be
awake." 1 7 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals apparently agreed with this
analysis. It rejected McFarland's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, i8 find-
ing that the sleeping lawyer met the
standard for effective counsel set by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Wash-
ington.19
George McFarland is not the only
person condemned to die in Houston
after a trial in which his defense lawyer
slept. Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson
both had the misfortune to have attor-
ney Joe Frank Cannon assigned to de-
fend them. They are among two of
Cannon's ten clients who have been
sentenced to death.20 Cannon has been
appointed by judges in Houston to nu-
merous criminal cases in the last forty-
five years despite his tendency to doze
off during trial.21
Although the clerk of the court testi-
fied that "defense counsel was asleep on
several occasions on several days over
the course of the proceedings," 22 and
Cannon's case file on Calvin Burdine's
case contained only three pages of
notes,23 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals found that a sleeping attorney
was sufficient "counsel" under the Sixth
Amendment. 24
Professor David Dow of the University
of Houston Law Center, who repre-
sented Carl Johnson in post-conviction
proceedings, reported that upon his first
reading of the transcript of trial "the
ineptitude of the lawyer ... jump [ed]
off the printed page." 25
During long periods of jury voir dire,
while the State was asking questions of
individual jurors, the transcripts give
one the impression thatJohnson's law-
yer was not even present in the court-
room. Upon investigation, it turned out
that he was in fact present; it's just that
he was asleep.26
But sleeping during the trial was only
one aspect of counsel's deficient perfor-
mance. Professor Dow reports:
The lawyer did as bad ajob as one can
imagine. In addition to sleeping during
jury selection and portions of the testi-
mony itself, he neglected to interview
witnesses prior to putting them on the
stand, which led to the entertaining
spectacle of his not knowing in advance
what his own witnesses planned to say.
Although Johnson had given a confes-
sion, Johnson's lawyer put on a defense
urging thatJohnson was innocent.
27
Nevertheless, both the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
Johnson was not denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.2 8 Neither court
published its opinion.2 9 Carl Johnson
was executed on September 19, 1995.30
When state and federal courts uphold
death sentences in cases in which the
defense lawyer slept, not even the pre-
tense of fairness is being maintained in
the courts. Professor Dow correctly ob-
served that courts have "ceased caring
about the law" and "hide their shameful
opinions by not publishing them."' 31
Justice Blackmun described the inter-
ests that have become preeminent in the
administration of the death penalty in
one of his many dissents from the Court's
decisions limiting federal review of capi-
tal cases:
Federalism; comity; state sovereignty;
preservation of state resources; cer-
tainty: The majority methodically inven-
tories these multifarious state interests
.... One searches the majority's opin-
ion in vain, however, for any mention of
[a defendant's] right to a criminal pro-
ceeding free from constitutional defect
or his interest in finding a forum for his
constitutional challenge to his convic-
tion and sentence of death.3 2
Justice Blackmun could have added that
the most fundamental requirement for a
criminal proceeding free from constitu-
tional defect-the right to competent
counsel-is often missing because the

























Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washing-
ton adopted a standard that has made a
mockery of the right to counsel.33
A study of homicide cases in Philadel-
phia, which rivals Houston for its high
number of death cases, 4 found that the
quality of lawyers appointed to capital
cases in Philadelphia is so bad that "even
officials in charge of the system say they
wouldn't want to be represented in Traf-
fic Court by some of the people ap-
pointed to defend poor people accused
of murder."3 5 The study found that many
of the attorneys were appointed byjudges
based on political connections, not legal
ability: "Philadelphia's poor defendants
often find themselves being represented
by ward leaders, ward committeemen,
failed politicians, the sons ofjudges and
party leaders, and contributors to the
judges' election campaigns." 36
Studies have found the same poor
quality of representation in capital cases
in one state after another. The National
Law Journal, after an extensive study of
capital cases in six Southern states, which
account for the vast majority of execu-
tions, found that capital trials are "more
like a random flip of the coin than a
delicate balancing of the scales" because
the defense lawyer is too often "ill
trained, unprepared ... [and] grossly
underpaid."3 7
Nevertheless jurisdictions have ig-
nored previous recommendations by the
ABA and others to deal with these de-
fects. Indigent defense programs-al-
ready deficient due to underfunding
and overwhelming caseloads-are dete-
riorating even further due to lack of
funding, lack of structure, and lack of
independence. Legislatures are simply
unwilling to pay for an adequate defense
for the indigent and courts are unwilling
to order it.
The elimination of federal funding
for the capital resource centers created
in 1987 has resulted in inmates who had
not finished elementary school attempt-
ing to represent themselves in complex
proceedings in which their lives are at
stake. Exzavious Gibson, a twenty-four-
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year-old man with an IQ between 76 and
81, was not provided an attorney for a
post-conviction hearing in Georgia.38 The
hearing was a complete farce because
Gibson lacked the ability to present argu-
ment, offer evidence, or make objec-
tions.39 Nevertheless, a Georgia Superior
Court judge presided over the sham
hearing at which the state was repre-
sented against Gibson by an experi-
enced assistant attorney general who
took full advantage of Gibson's lack of
representation.
Federal habeas corpus, which has cor-
rected so many constitutional violations,
has been eviscerated. Without federal
habeas corpus relief, Tony Amadeo, who
was sentenced to death at age eighteen
in a two-day trial in Putnam County,
Georgia, would not be alive today. The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously or-
dered relief for Amadeo in 1988 after it
was revealed at a federal evidentiary
hearing that the prosecutor had secretly
directed jury commissioners to under-
represent African Americans in the jury
pools.40 Amadeo had been sentenced to
death in Georgia by a jury drawn from
those rigged pools. Tony Amadeo gradu-
ated summa cum laude from Mercer Uni-
versity in the summer of 1995.
It is doubtful whether, under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, evidentiary hearings would
be granted to Tony Amadeo and scores
of others who won habeas corpus relief
by showing fundamental violations of
the Constitution. The constitutional vio-
lations still will exist, but under the new
Act the federal courts are prohibited
from conducting evidentiary hearings
and receiving evidence of the violations.
Despite undeniable evidence that in-
nocent people are being sentenced to
death, that the quality of legal represen-
tation for the poor is a disgrace to our
country, and that race often plays a
decisive role in the sentencing decision
in many cases, politicians are demand-
ing less process, less judicial review, and
swifter executions.
The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism
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and Effective Death Penalty Act restrict-
ing the power of federal courts to cor-
rect constitutional error in criminal cases
are the result of decisions that results are
more important than process, that final-
ity is more important than fairness, and
that it is more important to get on with
executions than to determine whether
convictions and sentences were fairly
and reliably obtained. Such a system
produces results-convictions and death
sentences-but it does not produce jus-
tice.
The ABA was right to call for a morato-
rium. Fairness matters. Fairness is impor-
tant to achieving just results that com-
mand the respect of the community. A
fair process is essential to ensure that
decisions made by courts are as well
informed as humanly possible. Before
the execution of Horace Dunkins by the
State of Alabama in 1989, when newspa-
pers reported that Dunkins was mentally
retarded, at least one citizen who sat on
Dunkins' case as a juror came forward
and said that she would not have voted
for the death sentence if she had known
of his mental limitations. 41 Because of
the poor legal representation that
Dunkins had received from his court-
appointed lawyer, evidence of his mental
retardation was not presented to the
jury. The jury was unable to perform its
constitutional obligation to impose a
sentence based on "a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background,
character and crime," 42 because it was
not informed of his disability by defense
counsel. Nevertheless, Dunkins was ex-
ecuted.
No one can be expected to trust or
respect judgments obtained at trials in
which the accused was not represented
adequately. Although on occasion the
public demands a particular result in a
case, ultimately citizens will have little
respect for courts that bend with the
political winds and ignore fundamental
violations of the constitution.
The question of whether the death
penalty is being fairly and consistently
imposed is separate from the issue of
whether there should be a death penalty
at all. Both questions are important and
should be vigorously debated, but they
should not be confused. One can be in
favor of capital punishment but believe
that it should be imposed fairly. The
Supreme Court has held that "capital
punishment must be imposed fairly, and
with reasonable consistency, or not at
all."'43 The ABA, like other observers,
has found that the death penalty is not
imposed fairly and consistently.
The ABA's message to jurisdictions
that desire to carry out executions is that
the cost of ensuring fairness is one of the
costs of capital punishment. Yet the ABA's
documentation of systematic unfairness,
like others before it, is being met with
indifference or resistance by those with
the power to act on it. Jurisdictions have
grown accustomed to death on the
cheap. There is an impatience with pro-
cess, a frustration with delay, and what
appears to be an insatiable political appe-
tite for executions. Yet the report in
support of the ABA's recommendations
makes it clear that to continue down the
present path will result in even higher
costs-the continued corruption of the
criminal justice system and the eventual
lack of public respect for the courts and
their judgments.
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